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Comments

The Kiss of Death for "Living in Marital
Union": Strict Judicial Scrutiny of
Department of Homeland Security Marital
Fraud Procedures
Rachel Blitzert

Historically, the United States encouraged foreign immigration as a means of populating the nation.! In the 1920s, however,
Congress introduced an immigration quota system in response to
both nativist and labor organization pressure.2 These quotas
stood at odds with the primary policy goals of United States immigration: preserving family units and promoting family relationships.3 In order to reconcile this conflict, Congress enacted
the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")' to help guide its
limited naturalization policies.5 The INA provides favorable
treatment to the immediate family members-including
spouses--of United States citizens.'
t B.A. 2002, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Chicago.
1 David Moyce, Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due Process
Under the ImmigrationLaws, 74 Cal L Rev 1747, 1749 (1986).
2 Id.
3 Kikuyo Matsumoto-Power, Comment, Aliens, Resident Aliens, and U.S. Citizens in
the Never-Never Land of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 15 U Haw L Rev 61, 62-63
(1993) (noting the governmental policies that animate the Immigration and Nationality
Act).
4 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 USC § 1101 (Supp 1990).
5 Matsumoto-Power, 15 U Haw L Rev at 62-63 (cited in note 3), citing Fraudulent
Marriage and Fiance [sic] Arrangements to Obtain Permanent Resident Status: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 6 (1985) (statement of Alan C. Nelson, INS Commissioner).
6 Id at 62, citing INA §§ 216(a), (b)(2)(A)(i), 8 USC §§ 1186(a), 1152(b)(2)(a)(i)(Supp
1990).

495

496

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2004:

The INA, however, only allows for limited favorable treatment. 8 USC section 1430(a) provides that an alien married to a
citizen can be naturalized if the couple has lived "in marital union" for a period of three years prior to the petition for naturalization.' This requirement aims to help the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service,8 detect illegitimate "sham" marriages entered into
merely to gain American citizenship.9
Under the Constitution, regulation of naturalization is a legislative function.'" Accordingly, the courts defer to Congress
when addressing legal challenges to section 1430(a) and other
naturalization legislation." Because of this deference, courts
generally have applied rational basis review in cases challenging
naturalization statutes and regulations. 2 Under rational basis
review, courts only overturn statutes
that are not rationally re3
lated to a legitimate state interest.1
This Comment argues for a reevaluation of the proper standard of review that courts should apply when examining section
1430(a) in cases implicating the right to marry. Because the DHS
procedures impinge on the right to marry, a fundamental constitutional right, courts should review these procedures using strict
scrutiny.'" Application of strict judicial review to section 1430(a)
cases would create consistency between the review of section
7 8 USC § 1430(a) (2000).
8 The Homeland Security Act, 6 USC § 101 (2003), signed into law in November
2002, massively reorganized the nation's naturalization functions, dividing immigration
service functions and immigration enforcement functions into two separate agencies.
Immigration service functions were transferred from the INS to the DHS, and the INS
was abolished. See David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act
Reorganization: An Early Agenda for PracticalImprovements, 80 Interpreter Releases
601, 601-02 (2003).
9 Note, The Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation Policy, 99
Harv L Rev 1238, 1238 (1986).
1o See, for example, Zapp v DistrictDirector of Immigration and Naturalization,120
F2d 762, 764 (2d Cir 1941) ("It is well established that the expulsion of aliens is a sovereign power necessary to the safety of the country, to be regulated by the legislative department by such statutes as it deems wise policy to require.").
" See, for example, Marcello v Bonds, 349 US 302, 311 (1955) (discussing the "longstanding practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions
in the federal courts, and ... the special considerations applicable to deportation which
the Congress may take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in
immigration matters").
12 See Fiallo v Bell, 430 US 787 (1977); Califano v Jobst, 434 US 47 (1977); City of
New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297 (1976).
13 Cleburne v CleburneLiving Center, 473 US 432, 440 (1985).
14 This Comment addresses the right to marry of the United States citizen spouse,
not that of the alien spouse.
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1430(a) and the review of other laws that implicate fundamental
rights. Part I explains how DHS regulations impinge on the fundamental right to marry. Part II describes the function of fundamental rights and details the courts' inclusion of the right to
marry and the right to structure one's family in this group of
rights. Part III summarizes the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
regarding the standard of review for cases involving fundamental
rights. Part IV explains the lower standard of review applied in
cases involving the plenary power of Congress with a particular
focus on naturalization cases. Part V articulates the limits on
strict scrutiny set forth by the Supreme Court and presents a
model for determining the proper level of scrutiny for fundamental rights cases. This Part also describes two different approaches that courts have taken regarding legislation that implicates both naturalization statutes and the right to marry. Part
VI presents two lower court cases that have adopted a strict
scrutiny standard for evaluation of such legislation. Part VII
proposes an appropriate framework for DHS regulations in light
of the preceding discussion.
I. THE DHS REGULATIONS
A.

The Immigration and Nationality Act

The Immigration and Nationality Act grants preferential
naturalization status to the alien spouses of United States citizens or permanent residents. 5 Under section 1430(a), an alien
can become naturalized if (1) the alien's spouse is a United
States citizen; (2) the alien has resided within the United States
for three years; and (3) the alien has lived in marital union with
the citizen spouse for a period of three years prior to the petition
for naturalization. 6 The INA does not afford preferential status
to alien spouses engaged in sham marriages-situations in which
the couple has entered into marriage "for the purpose of evading
the immigration laws."" When an alien spouse applies for naturalization, the DHS conducts a marriage fraud interview to police the validity of the marriages of those aliens applying for
naturalization under the INA. 8 Based on the couple's responses
15 See INS Sham MarriageInvestigation Policy, 99 Harv L Rev at 1239 (cited in note
9).
16

8 USC § 1430(a) (2000).

17 Ferrantev INS, 399 F2d 98, 104 (6th Cir 1968).

18 8 USC § 1186(b)(1)-(b)(2) (2000).
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in the interview, a DHS officer makes a determination as to
whether or not the couple has lived "in marital union" for the
three years preceding the petition for naturalization.1 9
In order for an alien to marry a United States citizen and
remain in the United States, the couple must conform to the
DHS standard of "living in marital union."" This mandate violates the right to marry in two ways. First, the DHS does not accommodate marriages that differ culturally from the traditional
definition of American marriage. Thus, the requirement forces
the international couple to live in a prescribed manner-the
manner recognized as valid by the DHS.2" A secondary problem
emerges because the definition of "living in marital union" remains unsettled.22 The DHS does not recognize that many American marriages no longer fit the mold that it believes represents
the traditional American family.
B.

Forced Conformity to the DHS Standards

Both historically and currently, the DHS only acknowledges
marriages that conform to the model of the standard American
marriage. Under the DHS regime, the right to determine the nature of one's own marital life achieves legal recognition only
when it reflects a tradition founded in "the history and culture of
Western civilization."2 3 The DHS prerequisite that the international marriage fit the model of a traditional American marriage
lacks logical support, given that international marriages by definition blend two different cultures, at least one of which is not
American. The primary purpose for the DHS regulations lies in
preserving family unity and promoting family relationships.2 4 In
19 INS Sham MarriageInvestigation Policy, 99 Harv L Rev at 1241-43 (cited in note
9) (describing the special interview and the possibility of "postmarital supervision" which
typically involves visits by the DHS to the couple's home and interviews with friends,
neighbors, and coworkers).
20 See Matsumoto-Power, 15 U Haw L Rev at 70 (cited in note 3).
21 Id at 69-70 (cited in note 3) ("Whenever the couple does not conform to the INS
standard of a proper marriage, the INS considers the marriage a fraud.").
22 Compare In re Olan, 257 F Supp 884 (S D Cal 1966) (holding that a two and a half
month separation is insufficient to sever the obligations and responsibilities of marriage),
with United States v Maduno, 40 F3d 1212 (11th Cir 1994) (requiring that spouses actually live together to satisfy the "living in marital union" requirement). The court in
Maduno distinguished Olan by focusing on the fact that in Olan, the husband continued
to offer financial support to his wife, while the same was not true in Maduno, and that
there was no "intent of permanent separation" in Olan. Id at 1215-16.
23 Matsumoto-Power, 15 U Haw L Rev at 71 (cited in note 3), quoting Wisconsin v
Yoder, 405 US 205, 232 (1972).
24 See INS Sham MarriageInvestigation Policy, 99 Harv L Rev at 1239 (cited in note
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practice, however, the DHS effectively marginalizes and discourages some families that its procedures intend to help.25
One example of DHS bias is the DHS's search for documentation of commingling of finances during a marriage fraud interview. 6 In some cultures, stable, successfully married couples do
not customarily jointly own bank account or credit cards.27 Similarly, the DHS also looks to joint ownership of property to establish the authenticity of a marriage," though some non-American
cultures rest property ownership rights in the husband alone.29
Courts have not ignored this predicament completely. The
Ninth Circuit, in Bark v INS, ° observed that the courts should
not require alien spouses to have "more conventional or more
successful marriages than citizens."' Bark involved consideration of an Immigration Judge's determination that an international marriage was a sham because the couple eventually separated.32 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Immigration Judge and
Board of Immigration Appeals' logic, instead asserting that
"[a]ny attempt to regulate [the couple's] lifestyles, such as prescribing the amount of time they must spend together, or designating the manner in which either partner elects to spend his or
her time, in the guise of specifying a bona fide marriage would
raise serious constitutional questions." 3 The courts have further
recognized that DHS regulations may not directly interfere with
a couple's decision not to engage sexual activity. 4

9).
25

Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the FunctionalApproach to

the Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv L Rev 1640, 1655 (1991) (critiquing the functionalist approach to the legal definition of family, which legitimizes nontraditional families insofar as they share the essential characteristics of traditional family units).
26 8 CFR § 204.2(a)(i)(B)(3).
27 Matsumoto-Power, 15 U Haw L Rev at 72 (cited in note 3).
28 8 CFR § 204.2(a)(i)(B)(2).
29 Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Special Report: Contemporary African
Legal Issues: Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture, and Women's Inheritance Rights in

Ghana, 25 Fordham Intl L J 259, 318 n 295 (Dec 2001) ("[U]nder customary law a woman
has a duty to labor for her husband and does not acquire ownership rights to the property
she works with him to acquire.").
30 511 F2d 1200 (9th Cir 1975).
31 Id at 1201-02.
32 Id at 1201.
33 Id.

In re Peterson, 12 I & N Dec 663 (BIA 1968) (upholding the validity of a marriage
between two elderly individuals where the couple intended to refrain from sexual activity).
31
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What Does "Living in Marital Union" Mean?

Moreover, even assuming the propriety of the conformity requirement, the DHS fails to recognize that the standard American marriage no longer mirrors the traditional American family.
During the twentieth century, the United States Congress relied
on an outdated definition of the American family: a working father and a stay at home mother together raising children.35 Today, however, this image does not reflect a number of American
marriages. 6 The most flagrant deviations from traditional ideals
include those marriages in which the spouses do not reside together or where they participate in an open marriage-where
one or both spouses engage in discrete romantic relationships
with persons outside of the marriage.3 7
A number of other variations on the traditional model that
occur in many American marriages may result in a finding of
lack of marital union by the DHS. For instance, some couples
keep their legal and financial affairs separate.3 8 Elderly spouses
commonly lack a sexual component to their marriages.39 Such
couples' responses to the DHS marriage fraud interview questions about finances and sex life might flag them as potentially
fraudulent marriages.4" These examples illustrate that the DHS
should not conclusively deny legal recognition of a marriage
"when, as frequently occurs, the marriage does not include one or
more of the features associated with the traditional American
nuclear family, such as economic cooperation, common residence,
sexual relations, and the potential for natural reproduction and
childrearing within the relationship.' '

35 Jennifer Wriggins, Kinship and Marriage in Massachusetts Public Employee Retirement Law: An Analysis of the Beneficiary Provisions, and Proposals for Change, 28
New Eng L Rev 991, 991 (1994).
36 Id at 992 (observing that the image of the "traditional" American family no longer
matches current demographics).
37 Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-ModernPolygamy: ConsideringPolyamory, 31 Cap U L Rev 439, 445 (2003) (noting the rise in these types of flexible relationships).
38 Family Resemblance, 104 Harv L Rev at 1654 (citation omitted) (cited in note 25).
39 Id.
40 See INS Sham MarriageInvestigation Policy, 99 Harv L Rev at 1243 (cited in note
9) ("The INS may, for example, ask questions about... the division of household chores..
. the method of birth control used, the consummation of the marriage, and the sexual
conduct of the couple before and after marriage.") (citations omitted).
41 Family Resemblance, 104 Harv L Rev at 1654 (cited in note 25).
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The DHS regulations become improper when they threaten a
fundamental right. The American legal system recognizes certain
implied fundamental rights in addition to those enumerated in
the Bill of Rights. 4' The concept of a fundamental right derives
from the Fourteenth Amendment. 43 The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the federal government
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. 4 The Supreme Court has interpreted the liberty
guarantee of the Due Process Clause as granting a number of
substantive rights,45 including the right to be free from bodily
restraint, the right to marry, and the right to establish a home
and bring up children.46 Substantive due process incorporates
into the Constitution those rights inherent to the concept of liberty, yet not specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.4 7
A. The Development of the Doctrine of
Fundamental Rights
The concept of a fundamental right developed from the recognition and the subsequent expansion of the right of privacy by
the Supreme Court.' The right of privacy forms the cornerstone
42 See W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice Ginsburg's Charge That the Constitution is
"Skimpy" in Comparison to Our InternationalNeighbors:A Comparison of Fundamental
Rights in American and Foreign Law, 39 S Tex L Rev 951, 954-55 (1998) (describing the

variety of definitions that have been offered for "fundamental rights").
43 See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in
the FundamentalRights Realm, 33 Howard L J 287, 290 (1990) ("The modem fundamental rights doctrine has found such rights vested either in the equal protection or the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.").
44 US Const Amend XIV § 1. See also United States v Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 554
(1876) (reiterating the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment).
45 See, for example, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg concurring) ("IT]he Due Process Clause protects those liberties that are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.") (citation omitted);
Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399 (1923) (stressing the breadth of substantive due process, which protects and includes "privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
46 Meyer, 262 US at 399.
47 See Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 502 (1977) (plurality), citing
Harlan's dissent in Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 542-43 (1961) (describing the "rational
continuum" of substantive rights which cannot be limited to "a series of isolated points
pricked out" in the Constitution).
48 See Meyer, 262 US at 403 (invalidating a state law forbidding all grade schools
from teaching subjects in any language other than English and establishing the privacy
right to direct the education and upbringing of one's child); Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268
US 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating a state law requiring students to attend public
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of substantive due process. 49 The rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to
maintain marital privacy, to use contraception, to enjoy bodily
integrity, and to have an abortion, all constitute elements of pri50
vacy.
Griswold v Connecticut" represents a significant affirmation
of the right of privacy." Griswold involved the convictions of the
directors of two directors of medical clinics under a Connecticut
statute forbidding the use of contraceptives.53 Specifically, section
53-32 of the General Statutes of Connecticut proscribed the use
of "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception," and the lower court found that the directors had violated this statute as accessories.54 The Supreme
Court began its analysis of the Connecticut statute by reaffirming the fundamental rights foundation developed in its prior
caselaw.55 The Court then broadened the scope of fundamental
rights by introducing the notion of privacy as a penumbral right
of the Bill of Rights.56 The Court asserted that the right of privacy is "legitimate" and identified a "zone of privacy created by
several constitutional guarantees."5 7 In reversing the defendants'
convictions, the Court found the Connecticut statute repulsive to
the notions of privacy that protect the marriage relationship."
Since Griswold, the Supreme Court has expanded its notion
of privacy to include a catalog of fundamental rights: the rights
to marry, to procreate, to have an abortion, to rear one's children,
schools and establishing the privacy right to direct the education and upbringing of one's
child); Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating a state sterilization
statute and establishing a privacy right to bodily integrity).
49 See, for example, Carey v Population Services International, 431 US 678, 685
(1977) (recognizing that intrusions on the fundamental right of privacy implicate substantive due process).
50 See Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720 (1997) (listing cases that recognized these rights).
51 381 US 479 (1965).
52

Id at 483.

53 Id at 480.
54 Id.
55 Griswold, 381 US at 482-83. The Court emphasized two of its prior cases in particular: Pierce, 268 US 510, and Meyer, 262 US 390. In Pierce, the Court held that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments include a right to educate one's children as one
chooses. 268 US at 535. Meyer gives comparable protection to the right to study languages
other than English. 262 US at 402-03.
56

57
58

Id at 484-86.
Id at 485.
Id at 486.
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and to direct their education.59 Through the various holdings establishing these rights, the Court has fashioned a traditionbased analysis to determine which privacy interests deserve fundamental status. Specifically, the Court relies heavily on the
constitutional amendments to evidence this tradition." The
Court's analysis aims to determine which personal rights are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"' and then applies
these immunities against both the federal and state governments." This inquiry looks at whether the asserted right is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 3 Thus, only
those liberties "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people" achieve fundamental status.6
B.

The Fundamental Right to Marry

Throughout American history, marriage functioned as an
indispensable tool for the growth and preservation of the nation.65 As American caselaw developed, the Supreme Court continually evidenced a respect for the institution of marriage. 66 As
early as the 1880s, the Court stressed the importance of the
59 See, for example, Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) (invalidating a state statute
prohibiting interracial marriages and asserting the right to marry); Skinner, 316 US at
535 (establishing the right to procreate); Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) (invalidating
state legislation making abortion criminal). See also Pierce, 268 US at 535 (protecting
child rearing and education rights); Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166 (1944) (discussing family relationships); Meyer, 262 US at 390 (discussing education).
60 See United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152-53 n 4 (1938) ("There
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth."). Justice Stone's "Footnote 4" is widely recognized as
the origin of the strict scrutiny analysis. See, for example, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene
ProductsRevisited, 82 Colum L Rev 1087, 1088 (1982) ("This footnote now is recognized
as a primary source of 'strict scrutiny' judicial review."). Justice Stone suggests that the
Court's review of legislation would be more exacting when the legislation implicated the
rights specified within the Bill of Rights and "embraced within the Fourteenth." Carolene
Products,304 US at 152-53 n 4.
61

Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 325 (1937).

Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784, 795 (1969) ("Once it is decided that a particular
Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to the American scheme of justice ...the same
constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.") (citations omitted).
63 Moore, 431 US at 503.
64 Griswold, 381 US at 487 (Goldberg concurring).
65 Consider Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 384 (1978) (discussing the role of marriage in promoting familial and societal stability).
66 See, for example, Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248, 256-57 (1983) ("The institution of
marriage has played a critical role both in defining the legal entitlements of family members and in developing the decentralized structure of our democratic society.").
62
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marital relationship, labeling it "the most important relation in
life" and essential for civilization and progress.67 The Court asserted that the nation's most wholesome and necessary legislation served to maintain family," and the Court defined family as
"consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man
and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony." 9 More recently,
the Court characterized the marital relationship as "intimate to
the degree of being sacred."0 The Court stated that "[marriage] is
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects. " "
In accordance with its recognition of the importance of marriage, the Court has acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to marry. In Meyer v Nebraska,2 the
Court recognized the right "to marry, establish a home and bring
up children" as a central element of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 The Court reaffirmed this assertion in Skinner v Oklahoma. " Skinner dealt specifically with a state sterilization statute and its implications for the right to procreate. 5 In analyzing
the breadth of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause,
the Court stated that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race" and labeled
these activities as "basic civil rights of man.""
The Court formally established the fundamental right to
marry in Loving v Virginia." Loving involved the invalidation of

70

Maynard v Hill, 125 US 190, 205, 211 (1888).
Murphy v Ramsey, 114 US 15, 45 (1885).
Id.
Griswold, 381 US at 486.

71

Id.

72

262 US 390 (1923).

67
68
69

73 Id at 399.
74 316 US 535, 541 (1942) (defining marriage and procreation as a "basic liberty").
75 Id at 536.
76

Id at 541.

77 388 US 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the

vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."). See also
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Beyond Baehr: Strengthening the Definition of Marriage,12 BYU
J Pub L 277, 280 (1998) (noting that Loving established a fundamental right to marry). It
should be noted that not all academics read Loving's language to signify the endowment
of fundamental status on the right to marry. See, for example, E. Todd Wilkowski, Comment, In Defense of MarriageAct: Will It be the Final Word in the Debate Over Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Unions?, 8 Regent U L Rev 195, 200 (1997) ("In Loving, the
Court stopped short of designating the right to marry as a fundamental right.").
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state miscegenation laws."8 At the outset of its right to marry
discussion, the Court stated that "the freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."79 Citing Skinner,
the Court declared that "[M]arriage is one of the 'basic civil
rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." °
In Zablocki v Redhail,8 1 the Court reaffirmed the fundamental status of the right to marry.82 Zablocki involved a Wisconsin
statute requiring court approval of any marriage of a Wisconsin
resident who had failed to pay child support.83 The Court included the right to marry "among the [personal] decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government interference." 4 The Court did not rely entirely on its holding in Loving.
Instead, the Court independently reasoned that "it would make
little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other
matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our
society. "
In accordance with its determination that the right to marry
is fundamental, the Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to the
Wisconsin statute and found it unconstitutional.86 The Court
stated that statutory requirements affecting the right to marry
could not be upheld unless "supported by sufficiently important
state interests and . . . closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests."8 7 Though the Court conceded that the state had legitimate and substantial interests in erecting its law, the Court
found it unconstitutional for the state to achieve these interests
through an impingement on the right to marry8 -a clear acknowledgement that the right to marry is fundamental. In short,
in order to avoid impinging on the fundamental right to marry,

78 Loving, 388 US at 6-7.
79 Id at 12.
80 Id, quoting Skinner, 316 US at 541.
81 434 US 374 (1978).
Id at 384.
83 Id at 375.
82

84 Id at 385 (citation omitted).
85 Zablocki, 434 US at 386.
86 Id at 377-82, 388.
87 Id at 388.
88 Id.
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the statute needed to be more closely tailored to the state's interests. 9
Recently, in Turner v Safley, ° the Court addressed the right
to marry in the penal setting.9" The Court struck down a prison
regulation limiting all Missouri inmates' right to marry by conditioning that right on the receipt of the prison superintendent's
approval.92 The Court applied a reasonable relation standard of
review to the regulation.93 The reasonable relation standard resembles the rational basis test in that it requires the court to
examine whether there is a "valid, rational connection" between
the regulation at issue and a legitimate government interest.94
The Safley reasonable relation standard, however, also requires
the court to consider the presence or absence of alternative
means, as well as any "ripple effect[s]" of an accommodation of
the asserted right.95
The Court utilized this standard in place of strict scrutiny
because of the need to "formulate a standard of review for prisoners' constitutional claims that is responsive both to the policy
of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the
need to protect constitutional rights."96 Despite the application of
a lower level of scrutiny,9" the Court maintained that the sanctity
of the right to marry overrode the state's interest in prison security.98 Thus, the Court legitimized the fundamental right to
marry by emphatically granting it to criminals-a class of citizens whose liberty interests the state has already severely curtailed.99
Zablocki, 434 US at 388.
90 482 US 78 (1987).
91 Id at 81.
89

92

Id at 96.

93 Id at 89.
94 482 US at 89.
95 Id at 90.
96 Id at 85. It should be noted that this logic regarding the proper level of scrutiny
does not apply to the American citizens' right to marry with which this Comment is concerned. The Court carefully noted that this low standard of review stemmed from the
penal setting: "such a standard is necessary if prison administrators are to make the
difficult decisions concerning institutional operations." Id at 89 (internal quotation omitted).
97 Safley, 482 US at 89. The Court established the following standard: "when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id (emphasis added).
98

Id at 97.

99 See Alison Nicole De Gregorio, Single and Bankrupt: What Right Does a Debtor
Have to Marry?, 15 Bankr Dev J 427, 443 (1999) ("[I1n Turner, the Supreme Court ele-
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The Right to Structure One's Family

The right to marry is part of the larger right to structure
one's family. As Justice Harlan articulated, "the full scope of the
liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in
or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution."' 0 Accordingly, the scope of
the right to structure one's family has developed through a number of cases, each recognizing a different aspect of the right.'01
In Moore v City of East Cleveland,"2 the Supreme Court consolidated its various family rights holdings under the umbrella of
"the sanctity of the family."0 3 Justice Powell, writing for himself
and three other justices, stated that prior "decisions establish
that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition." 4 Justice Powell quoted Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v Ullman"5 for further support:
[Here] we have not an intrusion into the home so much as
on the life which characteristically has its place in the
home.... The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat
of family life. And the integrity of that life is something so
fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted
Constitutional right.0 6
In accordance with fundamental rights jurisprudence, Powell
stated in Moore that "[wihen a city undertakes such intrusive
regulation of the family . . .the usual judicial deference to the

vated the status of marriage on the spectrum of fundamental rights by insulating it from
restriction in a system founded on and perpetuated by restrictions.").
100 Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan dissenting).
'O' See, for example, Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972) (recognizing the right of
parents to assume the primary role in decisions concerning the rearing of their children);
Pierce, 268 US 510 (1925) (recognizing the right of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control); Meyer, 262 US 390 (recognizing
parents' right to have their children instructed in a foreign language). For a more extensive list of cases addressing the scope of the right to structure one's family, see Moore v
City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 499 (1977) (plurality).
102 431 US 494 (1977) (plurality).
103 Id at 503.
104 Id.
105 367 US 497 (1961).
106 Moore, 431 US at 503-04 n 12, quoting Poe, 367 US at 551-52 (Harlan dissenting).
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legislature is inappropriate."" 7 The Court subsequently has recognized this right of ordering familial relationships under other
titles, such as "the right to maintain certain familial relationships"0 8 and "the right to structure family living arrangements."' 9
This discussion of the right to structure one's family
is designed to appease those who are skeptical about the existence or
breadth of the fundamental right to marry. This Comment maintains that the DHS requirements impinge on the fundamental
right to marry, but suggests that those requirements also impinge on the fundamental right to structure one's family.
III. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
Bestowing fundamental status on a given personal right carries considerable legal significance. Fundamental rights garner a
particularly high degree of protection because an alleged encroachment on a fundamental right requires strict scrutiny by a
court. ° When reviewing a state regulation, courts employ various standards of review, ranging from strict scrutiny to rational
basis tests.' Strict scrutiny, the most exacting level of scrutiny
that courts implement,1 is reserved for two instances: (1) when
legislation operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class; and
(2) when legislation impinges on a fundamental right explicitly
or implicitly protected by the Constitution."' This second crite107

Moore, 431 US at 499.

108 Overton v Bazzetta, 123

S Ct 2162, 2167 (2003).

109 United States v Carlton,512 US 26, 41 (1994) (O'Connor concurring).

110FairPoliticalPractices Commission v Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 25 Cal
3d 33, 47 (1979) ("[W]hen there exists a real and appreciable impact on, or a significant
interference with the exercise of the fundamental right... strict scrutiny doctrine will be
applied."). See also Griswold, 381 US at 497 (Goldberg concurring) ("Where there is a
significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing
a subordinating interest which is compelling.").
111 See Kadrmas v Dickinson Public Schools, 487 US 450, 459 (1988) (explaining the
hierarchy of "strict scrutiny," "heightened scrutiny," and "the standard rational relation

test").
112 Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 920 (1995) (identifying strict scrutiny as "our most
rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional review").
113 See, for example, San Antonio School District v Rodriquez, 411 US 1, 17 (1973),
overruled in part by Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651 (1974) (outlining the first element of
Court's proper analysis: "whether the Texas system of financing public education operates
to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly
or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny"). See
also Rodriguez, 411 US at 31, quoting Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 642 (1969) ("The
Court today does not pick out particular human activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added protection.... To the contrary, the Court simply recog-
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rion encompasses cases involving a "significant interference"
with the exercise of a fundamental right."4 .Under strict scrutiny,
the regulation at issue will withstand judicial review only if it
serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored
to serve this interest.11 5
Accordingly, a court's application of strict scrutiny requires
the government to meet a particularly high burden. Courts have
interpreted the "narrowly tailored" condition to require that the
governmental regulation be "necessary, and not merely rationally related" to the accomplishment of the compelling interest.'
In practice, this requirement means that the statute must provide the least restrictive means for achieving the government's
interest."7 The necessity requirement of the "narrowly tailored"
inquiry mandates that a court weigh the regulation against any
proffered alternatives." 8 In practice, government regulations will
almost never survive a strict scrutiny analysis." 9 The rigor of the
strict scrutiny standard has inspired legal scholars to dub it "the
kiss of death" 2 ' for a challenged statute, as well as "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact.""1 '

nizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands.").
114 See Zablocki, 343 US at 388 ("When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported
by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.").
115 See Lawrence v Texas, 123 S Ct 2472, 2491 (2003) ("Our opinions applying the
doctrine known as 'substantive due process' hold that the Due Process Clause prohibits
States from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless the infringement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.").
116

McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184, 196 (1964). See also Griswold, 381 US at 497

(Goldberg concurring) (holding that the statute at issue must be found "necessary, and
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy").
117 United States v Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc, 529 US 803, 813 (2000). See

also Reno v ACLU, 521 US 844, 874 (2000) ("The [state's] burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.").
118 Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose:A Comprehensive Approach to

Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U Pa L Rev 1, 14 (2000) ("This aspect of the
narrow tailoring inquiry is not really about 'fit,' but about comparing the marginal benefits and costs of the use of a particular classification with those of some alternative if
there is one.").
119 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 Cal L Rev 297,

305-06 (1997) (discussing how strict scrutiny in the context of privacy doctrine is "fatal in
fact").
McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 514 US 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia dissenting).
Gerald A. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court:A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 Harv L Rev 1, 8 (1972).
120
121
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IV. THE EFFECT OF PLENARY POWER AND THE LOWER
SCRUTINY STANDARD

When selecting the proper standard of review for naturalization and DHS regulations, the courts consistently cite Congress's
plenary power to regulate matters of naturalization.'22 Yet, an
investigation into Congress's plenary power and the courts'
treatment of it supports the conclusion that when reviewing an
impingement on a fundamental right, the court's use of any
standard other than strict scrutiny is inappropriate.
The Source of Congress's Plenary Power

A.

The Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress the
power to regulate naturalization. Instead, the Constitution
grants the power "to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."'23 In The Chinese Exclusion Case,'24 however, the Court cemented the authority of Congress to regulate all matters involving naturalization. 25 The Court asserted that "[tihe power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty belonging to
the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign
powers delegated by the Constitution."126 The Court reaffirmed
and strengthened this conclusion in Oceanic Steam Navigation
2 7 In reviewing a federal customs statute,
Company v Stranahan.'
the Court in Stranahan stated that "over no conceivable subject
is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over
[matters of immigration]."'2
Balancing Plenary Power Against Fundamental Rights

B.

While the Supreme Court has shown deference to both Congress's power and fundamental rights, it has also explained their
relation to each other and prioritized fundamental rights over
plenary power. The Supreme Court has balanced fundamental
rights against plenary power most explicitly when considering
122 See, for example, Fiallo v Bell, 430 US 787, 792 (1977) ("[Tihe power over aliens is
of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.") (quotation
omitted).
123 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 4.
124 Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 581 (1889).
125

Id at 609.

126
127

Id.
214 US 320 (1909).

128

Id at 339.

495]

THE KISS OFDEATH FOR "LIVING IN MARITAL UNION"

511

fundamental rights claims against Congress's use of its plenary
power to regulate commerce.12 9 In Quill Corporationv North Dakota,13 ° the Court unequivocally stated that Congress, in the
name of regulating interstate commerce, "does not ... have the
131
power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause." Simi132
larly, in ASARCO Incorporatedv Idaho State Tax Commission,
Justice O'Connor explained this balancing another way: "this
Court's 'threshold' for invalidating state legislation should be
considerably higher under
the Due Process Clause than under
33
the Commerce Clause."
Consequently, Congress's plenary power should have no effect on the appropriate standard of scrutiny when reviewing a
statute that impinges on a fundamental right. Still, caselaw regarding the DHS regulations affecting the right to marry evidences the courts' inappropriate deference to Congress. Although
a fundamental right should take precedence over a plenary
power, the courts have repeatedly applied a lower standard of
scrutiny, as detailed in Part III C.
C.

Fundamental Rights Caselaw Employing the Lower
Standard of Review

In accordance with the Supreme Court's deference to the
plenary power of Congress over naturalization, the courts have
refused to review DHS regulations with strict scrutiny, regardless of these regulations' infringement on the right to marry. '34
Instead, the standard used by courts has resembled the rational
35 and City of New
basis scrutiny employed in Califano v Jobst1
7 provides
Orleans v Dukes. 3 ' The Court's holding in Fiallo v Bell"1
129
...

US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3 ("Congress shall have the Power... to regulate Commerce

among the several States.").

133

504 US 298 (1992).
Id at 305.
458 US 307 (1982) (O'Connor dissenting).
Id at 350 n 14.

134

Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to Marry, 41

130
131
132

Howard L J 289, 341-42 (1998) (noting that the standard of review of laws regulating
marriage is different than the strict scrutiny typically applied in fundamental rights
cases).
135 434 US 47 (1977).
136 427 US 297 (1976). See also Turner, 482 US at 97 ("We conclude that on this record, the Missouri prison regulation, as written, is not reasonably related to these penological interests. No doubt legitimate security concerns may require placing reasonable
restrictions upon an inmate's right to marry, and may justify requiring approval of the
superintendent.").
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an example of this deference to Congress's plenary power. In
Fiallo, the Court considered a federal statute denying preferential naturalization status to illegitimate children whose natural
fathers were American citizens."' The Court specifically rejected
the claim that a naturalization statute should receive more rigorous scrutiny than that normally applied to such legislation
simply because the statute impinged on the family relationship.3 9 The Court relied on its own historical recognition that the
power to expel or exclude aliens rests with the executive and legislative branches, and remains largely immune from judicial control. 4 °
The most liberal reading of Fiallo would interpret its prescribed standard of review as a rational basis standard,4 which
is what the progeny of caselaw adopting the Fiallo standard has
done. 42 The Court's own language supports this interpretation.
The specific language of Fiallo instructs that "congressional determinations such as this one are subject only to limited judicial
review.", 3 The Court affirmed the district court's holding that the
statutory provisions at issue were neither "wholly devoid of any
conceivable rational purpose" nor "fundamentally aimed at
"
achieving a goal unrelated to the regulation of immigration an implicit implementation of the rational basis test.
Following Fiallo, lower courts have exhibited the same deference to Congress's plenary power in right to marry cases involving naturalization regulations. Two circuit court cases in
particular, Anetekhai v INS... and Azizi v Thornburgh,'4' echoed
13'
138
139
140

430 US 787 (1977).
Id at 789.
Id at 795.
Id at 792.

141 See Jennifer Englander, Casenote, Tuan Anh Nguyen and Joseph Boulais v. Immigration and NaturalizationService, 3 Loyola J Pub Int L 202, 208 (2002) ("In Fiallo, the
Court recognized that Congress has exceptionally broad power to control the admission of
aliens, allowing the Court only a 'limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation.' [Fiallo] laid the foundation for ... a rational basis standard to grant Congress
great discretion when reviewing [immigration legislation].").
142 See Azizi v Thornburgh, 908 F2d 1130, 1133 n 2 (2d Cir 1990) (characterizing the
proper standard of review as a "rational basis" standard); Anetekhai v INS, 876 F2d 1218,
1224 (5th Cir 1989) (upholding the constitutionality of a naturalization statute because
"the distinction ... between aliens who marry while involved in deportation proceedings
and aliens who marry at other times.., has a rational basis").
143 Fiallo, 430 US at 795 n 6.
144 Id at 791.
141 876 F2d 1218 (5th Cir 1989).
146

908 F2d 1130 (2d Cir 1990).
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the logic of Fiallo when analyzing section 5 of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 ("Section 5").14 Section 5
requires that an alien spouse, married during deportation hearings, reside outside the United States for two years before he can
be considered an "immediate relative" for purposes of naturalization law. 4 1 "Immediate relative" status, which exempts an individual from statutorily imposed naturalization quotas, is generally automatically granted to a spouse of a United States citi149
zen.
In Anetekhai, a Fifth Circuit case, an international couple
challenged the constitutionality of Section 5. The court rested
its decision to apply limited judicial scrutiny on the Supreme
5 ' The court asserted that
Court's language in Fiallo.'
Fiallo
squarely rejected the plaintiffs' argument for strict scrutiny
based on the implication of a fundamental right, and accordingly
the court engaged in no independent review of the merits.'
In Azizi, the Second Circuit similarly emphasized Fiallo in
its decision to employ limited judicial scrutiny.'53 The plaintiff
couple in Azizi faced the same dilemma as the plaintiffs in Anetekhai, and brought a very similar Section 5 claim to the court.'
Regarding the appropriate standard of judicial scrutiny, the
court explained its inquiry as a balancing of "the fundamental
nature of the right to marry" against the consideration that "control over matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative,
largely within the control of the executive and the legislature.
The court rejected the Azizis' argument for strict scrutiny on the
grounds that the "Court [in Fiallo] was not persuaded by the appellants' contention that a strict level of scrutiny must be
147 8 USCS § 1154(g) ("Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section. .. a petition
may not be approved to grant an alien immediate relative status or preference status by
reason of a marriage which was entered into during the period described in section
1255(e)(2) of this title, until the alien has resided outside the United States for a 2-year
period beginning after the date of the marriage.").
148 See, for example, Anetekhai, 876 F2d at 1220-21 (upholding the constitutionality of
the deportation of an alien spouse under this provision).
149 See id at 1219; 8 USC § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
15o Anetekhai, 876 F2d at 1220-21.
151 Id at 1222.

Id at 1221-22.
Azizi, 908 F2d at 1133 ("[Following Fiallo], we reject the Azizis' contention that a
strict level of scrutiny must be adopted here because Section 5 affects their right to
marry.").
152

153

154 Id at 1132.
155 Id at 1133.
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adopted because the classification impinged on fundamental familial relationship rights of citizens and aliens."'5 6
D.

Reliance on Kleindienst and the Plenary Power of Congress

In applying a lower standard of review to cases involving the
DHS regulations regarding marriage, the courts have deferred to
the plenary power of Congress despite an infringement on a fun5 7 None of the cases discussed thus
damental right."
far has
weighed independently these interests against each other. Instead, each of these cases relies on the 1972 Supreme Court case
of Kleindienst v Mandel.'5 8
In Kleindienst, six American citizens challenged section
212(a)(28) of the INA, which denied a visa to Belgian journalist
Dr. Ernest E. Mandel, an advocate of communism, because the
Attorney General refused to grant a waiver authorizing Dr.
Mandel's admission into the United States. 9 Section 212(a)(28)
barred entry into the country by those individuals who advocated
or published on "the economic, international, and governmental
doctrines of world communism," unless the individual received a
waiver from the Attorney General.16 ° The American citizens
bringing the suit were professors who had invited Dr. Mandel to
speak or participate in colloquia with them. 6 ' The American citizens claimed that the statute was unconstitutional on its face
and as applied because it violated their First Amendment rights
to hear and meet with Dr. Mandel. 6'
After discussing the First Amendment interests at issue, the
Court declined to apply strict judicial scrutiny to the case. 63 The
156

Id.

See, for example, Azizi, 908 F2d at 1133; Anetekhai, 876 F2d at 1223.
158 408 US 753 (1972). See Fiallo, 430 US at 792 ("We are no more inclined to reconsider this line of cases today than we were five years ago when we decided Kleindienst v.
Mandel."); Anetekhai, 876 F2d at 1222 ("The Supreme Court made clear in Fiallo that, in
ruling on the constitutionality of a provision, we are to apply the same standard regardless of whether Fifth Amendment or First Amendment rights are asserted."); Azizi, 908
F2d at 1133 ("The Court was not persuaded by the appellants' contention that a strict
level of scrutiny must be adopted because the classification impinged on fundamental
familial relationship rights of citizens and aliens. In the same vein, we reject the Azizis'
contention that a strict level of scrutiny must be adopted here because Section 5 affects
their right to marry.").
159 408 US at 756-59.
160 Id at 755.
161 Id at 759.
162 Id at 760.
163 Kleindienst, 408 US at 769-70.
157
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Court reviewed caselaw highlighting the broad scope of Congress's plenary power, and then considered the American citizens' First Amendment argument in detail.6 The Court did not
suggest that First Amendment concerns could never prevail over
laws made pursuant to Congress's plenary power; instead the
Court found merely that the citizens' particular argument
"prove[d] too much."'65 The citizens' argument, as interpreted by
the Court, would apply to almost every alien excludable under
section 212(a)(28), since there probably would be an American
citizen who would like to meet and speak with any alien seeking
admittance to the United States. 6 6 From a policy perspective, the
Court preferred full deference to Congress's plenary power over a
regime in which every section 212(a)(22) claim required a balancing of "the strength of the audience's interest against that of the
government in refusing waiver to the particular alien applicant,
according to some as yet undetermined standard."'6 7
Fiallo and its progeny read Kleindienst to hold that an impingement on a fundamental right is not sufficient to trigger
strict judicial review of naturalization laws.'68 These cases, however, have misread Kleindienst. Kleindienst presents a very narrow holding:
In the case of an alien excludable under § 212 (a)(28),
Congress has delegated conditional exercise of this power
to the Executive. We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look
behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the FirstAmendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the
69
applicant.'
This statement evidences the Court's intent to apply its holding
in this case specifically to section 212 of the INA and the First

164 Id at 765-69 ('In summary, plenary congressional power to make policies and rules
for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established.").
165 Id at 768.
166 Id.
167 Kleindienst, 408 US at 769.
168 See, for example, Fiallo,430 US at 792, 794-95 ("We can see no reason to review
the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard than
was applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel, a First Amendment case.").
169 Kleindienst, 408 US at 770 (emphasis added).
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Amendment questions at issue. Thus, the specific language of the
Kleindienst holding confirms that this holding is more restricted
than courts later assumed in Fiallo and its progeny.
In addition, when considering the plenary power of Congress, the Court in Kleindienst took into account the implications
of the citizens' First Amendment claims. 7 ' The Court recognized
the significance of the citizens' specific interest in "sustained,
face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning."'71 The Court,
however, ultimately concluded that the citizens' specific First
Amendment claim "would prove too much,"'72 as explained above.
Thus, the Court denied strict scrutiny analysis to avoid the "unsatisfactory results [that] would necessarily ensue" from its application in the Kleindienst case.'7 3
Fiallo and its progeny incorrectly rely on Kleindienst for the
broad proposition that the plenary power of Congress takes
precedence over an alleged infringement of a fundamental right.
By investigating the First Amendment claim in depth and the
wording its holding specifically,'7 4 the Court in Kleindienst specifically avoided making a blanket statement to that effect.' 7 ' Additionally, the First Amendment slippery slope concerns evidenced by the Court in Kleindienst are not as evident in the marriage context. While any alien, and his citizen advocates, can
make the argument that there are citizens who want to speak
with him in the United States, 7 8 certainly not all aliens could
claim to be "immediate relatives" of American citizens or permanent residents for purposes of naturalization. 77 Even allowing for
the threat of sham marriages, the concern that using strict judicial scrutiny would provide an argument for every alien that
seeks naturalization is unreasonable.
V. LIMITATIONS ON STRICT SCRUTINY

While Congress's plenary power should not limit a court's
application of the strict scrutiny standard when the use of that
170

Id at 765-69.

'7'

Id at 765.

172

Id at 768.

113 Kleindienst, 408

US at 768.
Id at 770.
175 This Comment does not suggest that the Supreme Court does not have the authority to make such a blanket statement, only that it did not do so in Kleindienst.
174

176

Kleindienst, 408 US at 768.

177 Anetekhai, 876

F2d at 1219.
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power implicates fundamental rights, there are other limitations
on strict scrutiny. In Zablocki, the Court outlined a test that explains the appropriate circumstances under which to apply strict
scrutiny.
Zablocki Test

A.

In Zablocki, the Supreme Court introduced, by explicit
statement and by example, a test to determine whether a given
impingement on a fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny. In
the context of the right to marry, the Court explained that "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be
imposed."'7 8 Hence, the Court indicated that it would permit
some regulations on marriage. The Court expanded on this language to outline the parameters of a test for assessing the constitutionally of a given marriage regulation: only those regulations
substantially with the right to marry"
that "interfere directly and
179
scrutiny.
strict
face
will
The Court in Zablocki did not offer any explicit guidelines
regarding the implementation of its "directly and substantially"
test."'0 The Court's analysis of the Wisconsin marriage statute in
that case, however, read in conjunction with its earlier analysis
5 elucidates those factors that weigh heavily in its test.
in Jobst,"'
Comparing Zablocki and Jobst is particularly instructive for two
reasons: (1) the Court denied strict scrutiny analysis in Jobst, a
right to marry case;..2 and (2) the Court fashioned its holding in
Zablocki to accommodate, rather than overrule, its holding in
Jobst"'

Zablocki, 434 US at 386.
Id at 387.
180 See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy - Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich L Rev 463, 509 (1983)
("In attempting to fashion a test for evaluating the acceptability of state regulation of
marriage, the Marshall opinion offers little guidance.").
181 Jobst, 434 US at 47.
182 Id.
183 Zablocki, 434 US at 387 n 12 ("The directness and substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry distinguish the instant case from Califano v. Jobst.").
178
179
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Distinguishing Jobst

Jobst involved the marriage of two cerebral palsy sufferers.
The federal regulation at issue in the case terminated a dependant's social security benefits upon marriage to anyone not also
receiving benefits.185 Mr. Jobst, who suffered from cerebral palsy,
qualified for disabled child's insurance benefits after the death of
his father.'8 6 Mrs. Jobst, also a cerebral palsy sufferer, did not
receive any social security benefits of her own, either before or
after her marriage to Mr. Jobst"' Consequently, Mr. Jobst lost
his social security benefits when he married Mrs. Jobst, despite
the fact that his spouse also suffered from a permanent disabil88
ity.
The Court in Jobst found that the social security regulation
did not significantly interfere with the decision to enter into a
marital relationship.' This finding proved to be the primary basis for differentiating the facts of Zablocki from the facts of Jobst.
The Court in Zablocki stated that the social security legislation
at issue in Jobst "placed no direct legal obstacle in the path of
persons desiring to get married, and ... there was no evidence
that the laws significantly discouraged . . . any marriages. " "'
Since the Court in Jobst found no significant interference with
the exercise of a fundamental right, the Court refused to apply a
strict scrutiny analysis. 9 ' Instead, the Court applied the rational
basis standard detailed in Jefferson v Hackney'92 and Matthews v
De Castro'93 : the challenged statute is constitutional if it is "rational, and not invidious."'9 4 Dukes provides a more complete
definition of the rational basis standard. 9 In Dukes, the Court
explained the rational basis standard as follows: "[u]nless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn
upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion or
184

Jobst, 434 US at 48.

185 Id at 48 and 54-55.
186
187
188

Id.
Id.
Jobst, 434 US at 48.

189 Id at 54 ("[Tlhe marriage rule cannot be criticized ... as an attempt to interfere
with the individual's freedom to make a decision as important as marriage.").
190 Zablocki, 434 US at 387 n 12.
191 Jobst, 434 US at 54.
192 406 US 535, 546 (1972).
193 429 US 181, 185 (1976).
194 Jobst, 434 US at 54.
195 Dukes, 427 US at 297.
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alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the
statutory discriminations and require only that the classification
challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest."'96
While in Jobst the Court found that the regulation did not
interfere with the right to marry, in Zablocki the Court found
that the Wisconsin statute at issue interfered directly and substantially with the right to marry.'9 7 Zablocki involved the rights
of Wisconsin residents who were delinquent in their child support obligations.9 The statute provided that members of this
group could not marry without first obtaining a court order
granting them permission to marry.'99 The Court held that this
statute substantially interfered with the right to marry because,
among other effects, it coerced some residents into forgoing their
right to marry and forced others to suffer serious intrusions into
their freedom of choice when exercising their right to marry. °°
The Court explicitly differentiated its holding in Zablocki
from its previous holding in Jobst.2 °' The Court in Jobst stated
that the marriage statute at issue did not interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision on the important subject of
marriage. 2°2 The Court in Zablocki further explained this finding,
reiterating that "[tihe Social Security provisions [in Jobst] placed
no direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get
married."0 3 Thus, the basis for the Court's differentiation between the two cases rested in the deterrent effects of the legisla-

196

Id at 303.

197 Zablocki, 434 US at 387 n 12 (distinguishing Jobst on the grounds that the Social

Security Act "placed no direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married").
198 Id at 375.
199 Id.

Id at 387. It should be noted that, in addition to these burdens, the Court in
Zablocki listed even more flagrant impingements on the right to marry:
200

Under the challenged statute, no Wisconsin resident in the affected class may
marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere without a court order, and marriages contracted in violation of the statute are void and punishable as criminal offenses.
Some of those in the affected class... will never be able to obtain the necessary
court order, because they either lack the financial means to meet their support
obligations or cannot prove that their children will not become public charges.
These persons are absolutely prevented from getting married.
Zablocki, 434 US at 387.
201 Id at 387 n 12.
202 Jobst, 434 US at 54.
203 Zablocki, 434 US at 387 n 12.
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tion, or, as the Court put it in Zablocki, how significantly the law
discouraged persons desiring to get married.2 °4
VI. WHERE THE COURTS GOT IT RIGHT: THE
MANWANI ALTERNATIVE

In Manwani v INS,"' the Western District of North Carolina
adopted a more appropriate balancing of fundamental rights and
plenary power interests. In Manwani, the court addressed the
same Section 5 issue that the Fifth and Second Circuits addressed in Anetekhai and Azizi.2 6 Unlike those courts, the court
in Manwani found that "the deferential standard of review applied in Fiallo and advocated by the government does not apply
to the review of Section [5] .,07
The court in Manwani carefully distinguished the immediate
case from Fiallo, which, as a Supreme Court case, amounted to
binding precedent." 8 The court's first basis for differentiation lay
in the distinction between substantive policy and procedural policy. 2°9 The court in Manwani found that Fiallo did not control
because of "the crucial distinction enshrined in Fiallo (and numerous prior and subsequent decisions) between statutes that
define categories of admissible aliens and statutes that deprive
citizens or aliens of procedural rights."2 10 In substantiating this
argument, the court relied heavily on the now-vacated holding of
Escobar v INS,21 a D.C. Circuit case dealing with an identical
Section 5 claim. According to the court in Escobar:
[A] substantive provision is one that grants a status,
whereas a procedural provision is one subordinate to the
substantive grant and focusing on how or when a decision
is to be made to award the previously authorized substantive status. A procedural provision is, in other words, one

Id.
736 F Supp 1367 (W D NC 1990).
206 Id at 1370.
207 Id at 1379.
208 Id at 1374-76.
209 Manwani, 736 F Supp at 1375-77 ("Fiallo requires the courts to maintain the distinction between statutory provisions that set forth categories of familial relationships
and provisions that establish procedures designed to prevent circumvention of lawful
admission requirements.").
210 Id at 1375.
211 896 F2d 564 (DC Cir 1990), vacd without opinion, 925 F2d 488 (DC Cir 1991).
204
205
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that does not take away the statutory entitlement but is
aimed at the process by which the entitlement is gained.212
Using this rationale, the D.C. Circuit found Section 5 to be procedural, and thereby freed itself from the Fiallo framework.2 12
After granting a request for a hearing en banc, however, the D.C.
Circuit withdrew the opinion, 214 and later congressional action
mooted the issue in the case.1 5
Though the Manwani and Escobar decisions do not form
binding precedent, their interpretations of the law evidence a
growing recognition among the courts of the importance of fundamental rights. For example, the court in Manwani cited the
First Circuit case ofAbourezk v Reagan"' in support of its observation that "[riecent judicial decisions have recognized that the
Immigration Act may not penalize the exercise of a constitutional
right."17 Abourezk involved the claim of several American citizens that they were deprived of their First Amendment right to
associate with and hear the speech of the Interior Minister of
Nicaragua, whose visa had been denied. 18 The court held that
the government "may not, consistent with the First Amendment,
deny entry [to aliens invited to impart information and ideas to
American citizens] solely on account of the content of speech." 9
Abourezk instructs that the First Amendment, by protecting not
only speech but also the right to receive information and ideas,
imposes limits on the government's power to exclude aliens."O
At least one Supreme Court case, Reno v American-Arab
Anti-DiscriminationCommittee,2 ' has implicitly qualified Fiallo's
bright line rule, and has instead asserted that determination of
the appropriate level of scrutiny depends on the flagrancy of the
Id at 567.
Id at 568 ("The legislative history of Section 5 indicates that its primary aim was
procedural. Its purpose was to deter aliens facing exclusion or deportation from entering
into sham marriages in the first place.").
212
213

214 Hiroshi Motomura, The CuriousEvolution of Immigration Law: ProceduralSurrogates for Substantive Rights, 92 Colum L Rev 1625, 1661 n 181 (1992).
215 Id at 1662 ("Congress largely mooted the issue in 1990, by creating a limited exception [in the Immigration Act of 1990] for couples who can prove the bona fides of their
marriages.").
216 592 F Supp 880 (D DC 1984), revd and remanded on other grounds, 785 F2d 1043
(DC Cir 1986), affd by an equally divided Court, 484 US 1 (1987).
217 Manwani, 736 F Supp at 1378.
218 Abourezk, 592 F Supp at 881-82.
219 Id at 887.
220 Id at 886-87.
221 525 US 471 (1999).
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impingement on a fundamental right.22 2 In American-Arab, the
Court stated that First Amendment claims in removal hearings
may be viable where the prosecution reflects discrimination "so
outrageous
that the [plenary power] considerations can be over223
come."
Another Supreme Court case, INS v Chadha,224 has maintained the guarantees of the Constitution despite Congress's plenary power. In declaring Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act 225 unconstitutional, the Court stated that
"[tihe plenary authority of Congress over aliens.., is not open to
question, but what is challenged here is whether Congress has
chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing
that power."226 One scholar has even read Fiallo to suggest the
possibility that naturalization provisions could be struck down
by the courts. 22 7' This implication derives from Fiallo'sstatement
that that Congress's plenary power was "largely immune from
judicial control."22 8
VII. THE APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR THE DHS REGULATIONS
The DHS regulations interfere directly and substantially
with American citizens' and permanent residents' right to marry
aliens, and therefore fall within the Zablocki framework. The
Court's definition of direct and substantial interference, as presented in Zablocki, includes any obstacle that significantly discourages marriage or makes marriage practically impossible.2 29
This definition is consistent with the Court's holding in Jobst,
since the Court viewed the fact that the Jobsts married as strong
evidence that the federal regulation did not interfere directly and
substantially with their exercise of the right to marry.2 3 0
222 See id at 491 ("[We need not rule out the possibility of a rare case in which the
alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be
overcome.").
223 Id.
224 462 US 919 (1983).
225 8 USCS § 1254(c)(2) (2000), repealed by Pub L 104-208, div C, title III, § 308(b)(7),
Sept 30, 1996, 110 Stat 3009-615.
226 Chadha, 462 US at 940-41.
227 Lica Tomizuka, The Supreme Court's Blind Pursuit of Outdated Definitions of
Familial Relationships in Upholding the Constitutionalityof 8 U.S.C. 1409 in Nguyen v.
INS, 20 Law & Ineq J 275, 282 (2002).
228 Fiallo, 430 US at 792 (emphasis added).
229 Zablocki, 434 US at 387 n 12.
230 Id, citing Jobst, 434 US at 48 ("Indeed, [in Jobst,] the provisions had not deterred
the individual who challenged the statute from getting married, even though he and his
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The DHS regulations, however, create a direct obstacle to
marriage. In order for an international couple to marry and remain in the United States, the couple must conform to the DHS
standard of a traditional American couple. 3 ' The DHS, in effect,
mandates the lifestyle that the couple must live. Whether the
couple decides to adhere to the DHS guidelines, move out of the
United States, or give up on marriage entirely, the DHS requirements create a substantial impediment to international
marriages. Further, those couples that pursue marriages in the
United States risk deportation of the alien-spouse upon a DHS
finding that their marriage constitutes a sham marriage.
The burdensome effects of the DHS regulations parallel
those cited in Zablocki: some citizen spouses will forgo their right
to marry and others will suffer serious intrusions into their freedom of choice when exercising their right to marry.232 Those
American citizens wishing to enter into international marriages
will suffer the same impingements on their fundamental rights,
via application of the "living in marital union" standard, as those
cited by the Court in Zablocki. Accordingly, consistent with
Zablocki, strict scrutiny provides the proper standard of review
for international marriage cases challenging the DHS's "living
marital union" standard.
CONCLUSION

In the arena of international marriage law, the Supreme
Court must weigh two important interests: the American citizenry's right to marry and Congress's plenary power to regulate
naturalization. In its cases reviewing naturalization laws, the
Supreme Court has deferred to Congress's plenary power to regulate naturalization.2 33 In practice, this policy upholds the validity
of virtually all congressional legislation that touches on the field
of naturalization.23 4 In the case of marriage between a citizen and
non-citizen, this deference has even taken precedence over the

wife were both disabled.").
231

See Part I B.

See Zablocki, 434 US at 387.
See, for example, Fiallo, 430 US at 792 ("[I]t is important to underscore the limited
scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation.").
234 See Azizi, 908 F2d 1130 (upholding the constitutionality of a two year nonresidency requirement for aliens who marry US citizens while subject to deportation
hearings).
232
233
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citizen spouse's fundamental and constitutionally protected right
to marry. 235
The Supreme Court adopted its policy of deference to Congress without sufficient consideration of the fundamental rights
at issue in the cases it considered. The Court has read Kleindienst in the broadest and most extreme light-a reading which
the Kleindienst text neither requires nor encourages. 231
This Comment urges a reevaluation of the decision to apply
minimal scrutiny to all fundamental right to marry cases connected to DHS legislation. Instead, those cases that involve a
legitimate impingement on the right to marry, or any other fundamental right, should receive the same strict scrutiny generally
afforded to fundamental rights claims. 37 Manwani offers a
framework from which to develop a more appropriate balancing
of fundamental rights and plenary power interests. In Manwani,
the Western District of North Carolina acknowledged that strict
scrutiny should apply to naturalization cases that implicate fundamental rights.2 8 Now that the lower courts have outlined the
proper analysis, the Supreme Court should take the next steps:
acknowledging that strict scrutiny can and should apply to naturalization laws, and subjecting naturalization regulations that
restrict fundamental rights to the Zablocki direct and substantial standard. 39

235 See Anetakhai, 876 F2d 1218 (upholding the constitutionality of a two year nonresidency requirement for aliens who marry US citizens while subject to deportation
hearings).
236 Kleindienst, 408 US at 770.
237 Griswold, 381 US at 497 (Goldberg concurring).
238 Manwani, 736 F Supp at 1379-80.
239 Zablocki, 434 US at 387.

